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Abstract
Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking avail-
ability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide
upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken during the meeting, therefore
each team would like to maximize its relative attendance in the meeting (i.e., the propor-
tional number of its participating team members). We introduce a corresponding game,
where each team can declare (in the scheduling poll) a lower total availability, in order
to improve its relative attendance—the pay-off. We are especially interested in situations
where teams can form coalitions.
We provide an efficient algorithm that, given a coalition, finds an optimal way for each
team in a coalition to improve its pay-off. In contrast, we show that deciding whether such
a coalition exists is NP-hard. We also study the existence of Nash equilibria: Finding Nash
equilibria for various small sizes of teams and coalitions can be done in polynomial time
while it is coNP-hard if the coalition size is unbounded.
1 Introduction
An organization is going to hold a meeting, where people are to attend. Since people come
from different places and have availability constraints, an open online scheduling poll is taken
to decide upon the meeting time. Each individual can approve or disapproval of each of the
suggested time slots. In order to have the highest possible attendance, the organization will
schedule the meeting at a time slot with the maximum sum of declared availabilities. During the
meeting, proposals will be discussed and decisions will be made. Usually, people have different
interests in the decision making, e.g. they are from different teams that each want their own
proposals to be put through. We consider people with the same interest as from the same team
∗R. Bredereck is supported by the DFG fellowship BR 5207/2. N. Talmon is supported by an I-CORE ALGO
fellowship. Main work done while R. Bredereck and N. Talmon were with TU Berlin.
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and as a result, each team (instead of each individual) may declare (in the scheduling poll) the
number of its members that can attend the meeting at each suggested time slot.
For a simple illustration, suppose that three teams, t1, t2, and t3, are about to hold a
meeting, either at 9am or at 10am. Two members from t1, one member from t2, and three
members from t3 are available at 9am, while exactly two members of each team are available at
10am. The availabilities of the teams can be illustrated as an integer matrix:
A :=
c1 c2( )
2 2 t1
1 2 t2
3 2 t3
A time slot is a winner if it receives the maximum sum of declared availabilities. Thus, if the
three teams declare their true availabilities, then both 9am and 10am co-win (since six people
in total are available at 9am and 10am each), and the meeting will be scheduled at either 9am
or 10am.
Now, if a team (i.e. people with the same interest) wants to influence any decision made
during the meeting, then it will want to send as many of its available team members to the
meeting as possible because this will maximize its relative power—the proportion of its own
attendees. For our simple example, if the meeting is to be held at 9am, then the relative powers
of teams t1, t2, and t3 are 1/3, 1/6, and 1/2, respectively. This again means that a sophisticated
team will change its availabilities declared in the poll from time to time. However, each team
must not report a number which is higher than its true availability since it cannot send more
members than available. Given this constraint, it is interesting to know whether any team can
increase its relative attendance by misreporting about its availability.
Aiming to have more power in the meeting, our teams can declare a different number than
their true availabilities, possibly changing the winning time slot to one where their relative
powers are maximized. For the case where several time slots co-win, however, it is not clear
which co-winning time slot will be used. To be on the safe side, the teams must maximize
the relative power of each co-winning time slot. In other words, our teams are pessimistic and
consider their pay-off as the minimum over all the relative powers at each co-winning time slot.
In our example, this means that the pay-off of team t2 would be 1/6, since this is its relative
power at 9am, which is smaller than its relative power, 1/3, at 10am. The pay-offs of teams t1
and t3 are both 1/3. In this case, team t2 can be strategic by updating its availability and
declare zero availability at 9am; as a result, the meeting would be held at 10am, where team t2
has better pay-off with relative number of 1/3.
We do not allow arbitrary deviations from the real availabilities of teams; specifically, we do
not allow a team to declare as available a higher number than actually available. Further, we
do not allow a team to send more team members to the meeting than it declared as available,
because this is often mandated by the circumstances. As some examples, we mention that the
organizer might need to arrange a meeting room and specify the number of participants in the
meeting up-front (similarly, if the meeting is to be carried in a restaurant, the number of chairs at
the table shall be decided beforehand); or the organizer might need to obtain buses to transport
the participants. Thus, the teams must send exactly the declared number of members to the
meeting. For instance, it is not possible for team t2 to declare 3 at 9am since only one of its
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team members is available. A formal description of the corresponding game, called team power
game (TPG, in short), and a discussion on our example are given in Section 2.
As already remarked, to improve the pay-off, a team may lie about the number of its available
members. Sometimes, teams can even form a coalition and update their availabilities strategi-
cally. In our example, after team t2 misreported its availabilities such that each team receives a
pay-off of 1/3, teams t1 and t3 may collaborate: if both teams keep their declared availabilities
at 9am but declare zero availability at 10am (note that team t2 does not change its updated
availabilities), then 9am will be the unique winner (with total availability of 5); as a result, t1
and t3 receive better pay-offs of 2/5 and 3/5, respectively. Such a successful deviation from the
declared availabilities of the teams in a coalition (while keeping the declared availabilities of the
teams not in the coalition unchanged) is called an improvement step.
After some teams perform an improvement step, other teams may also want to update their
availabilities to improve. This iterative process leads to the question of whether there is a stable
situation, where improvement is impossible—a Nash equilibrium. Of course, when searching for
equilibria, it is natural to ask how hard it is to decide whether an improvement step is possible.
In this paper, we are interested in the computational complexity of the following problems:
(1) finding an improvement step (if it exists) for a specific coalition, (2) finding an improvement
step (if it exists) for any coalition, and (3) finding a t-strong Nash equilibrium (if it exists).
Main Contributions.We show that, depending on the size of the coalition (i.e., the amount of
collaboration allowed), the computational complexity of finding an improvement step for a given
coalition and deciding whether an improvement step exists for an arbitrary coalition ranges from
being polynomial-time solvable to being NP-hard; further, deciding whether an improvement step
exists for any coalition of size at most t is W[2]-hard when parameterizing by the coalition size t.
We show that a 1-strong Nash equilibrium always exists for some special profiles and we provide
a simple polynomial-time algorithm for finding it in these cases. Finally, we show that deciding
whether a t-strong Nash equilibrium exists is coNP-hard. Our results are summarized in Table 1.
Related Work. Recently, online scheduling polls such as Doodle / Survey Monkey caught the
attention of several researches. Reinecke et al. [14] initiated empirical investigations of scheduling
polls and identified influences of national culture on people’s scheduling behavior, by analyzing
actual Doodle polls from 211 countries. Zou, Meir, and Parkes [15] also analyzed actual Doodle
polls, and devised a model to explain their experimental findings. They observed that people
participating in open polls tend to be more “cooperative” and additionally approve time slots
that are very popular or unpopular; this is different to the behavior of people participating in
closed polls. Obraztsova et al. [13] formally modeled the behavior observed by Zou, Meir, and
Parkes [15] as a game, where approving additional time slots may result in pay-off increase.
While the game introduced by Obraztsova et al. [13] captures the scenario that each individual
player tries to appear to be cooperative, our team power game models the perspective that each
individual team (player) as a whole tries to maximize its relative power in the meeting, which
means that approving more time slots is not necessarily a good strategy.
Quite different in flavor, Lee [9] considered a computational problem from the point of view
of the poll initiator, whose goal is to choose the time slots to poll over, in order to optimize
a specific cost function. Finally, since scheduling polls might be modeled as approval elections,
we mention the vast amount of research done on approval elections in general, e.g., [1] and on
iterative approval voting in particular, e.g., [2, 11, 12].
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Table 1: Complexity results for the team power game. “Unary” (resp. “Binary”) means that the
input and the strategy profiles are encoded in unary (resp. binary). Variable t stands for the
number of teams in a coalition, while amax stands for the maximum true availability. An entry
labeled with “P” means polynomial-time solvability. An entry labeled with “FPT for k” means
solvability in f(k) · |I|O(1) time, where f is a function solely depending on k and |I| denotes the
size of the given input. An entry labeled with “W[2]-hard for k” implies that the corresponding
problem is not “FPT for k” unless W[2] = FPT (this is considered unlikely in parameterized
complexity theory).
(1) Finding an improvement step for a given coalition
Unary in P (Thm. 1)
Binary in FPT for t (Thm. 2)1
(2) Deciding the existence of an improvement step
for any coalition
Binary in P for constant t (Cor. 1)
amax = 1 NP-complete (Thm. 3)
amax = 1 W[2]-hard for t (Thm. 3)
(3) Finding a 1-strong Nash equilibrium
amax ≤ 3 in P, always exists (Thm. 4)
amax ≥ 4 open (Rem. 2)
Finding a 2-strong Nash equilibrium
amax = 1 in P, always exists (Prop. 1)
amax ≥ 2 open, does not always exist
Deciding the existence of a t-strong Nash equilibrium
amax = 2 coNP-hard (Thm. 5)
1We conjecture it to be even in P. Strong NP-hardness is excluded by Theorem 1.
2 Preliminaries
We begin this section by defining the rules of the game which is of interest here. Then, we
formally define the related computational problems we consider in this paper. Throughout,
given a number n ∈ N, by [n] we mean the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Rules of the Game. The game is called the team power game (TPG, in short). It consists of n
players, the teams, t1, t2, . . . , tn, and m possible time slots, c1, c2, . . . , cm. Each team ti is associ-
ated with a true availability vector Ai = (a
1
i , a
2
i , . . . , a
m
i ), where a
j
i ∈ N is the (true) availability
of team ti for time slot cj . Importantly, each team is only aware of its own availability vector.
During the game, each team ti announces a declared (availability) vector Bi = (b
1
i , b
2
i , . . . , b
m
i ),
where bji ≤ a
j
i is the declared availability of team ti for time slot cj ; using standard game-
theoretic terms, we define the strategy of team ti to be its declared availability vector Bi. We
use A and B to denote the matrices consisting of a row for each team’s true and declared avail-
ability vectors. That is, for i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], A := (aji ), B := (b
j
i ). Given a declared availability
matrix B, the co-winners of the corresponding scheduling poll, denoted as winners(B), are the
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time slots with the maximum sum of declared availabilities:
winners(B) := argmax
cj∈{c1,c2...,cm}
{
∑
i∈[n]
bji}.
Before we define the pay-off of each team, we introduce the notion of relative power. The
relative power team-power(B, ti, cj) of team ti at time slot cj equals the number of members
from ti who will attend the meeting at time slot cj , divided by the total number of attendees at
this time slot:
team-power(B, ti, cj) :=
bji∑
k∈[n] b
j
k
.
In order to define the pay-off of each team, we need to decide how to proceed when several
time slots tie as co-winners. In this paper we consider a maximin version of the game, where
ties are broken adversarially. That is, the pay-off of team ti is defined to be the minimum, over
all co-winners, of its relative power :
pay-off(B, ti) := min
cj∈winners(B)
team-power(B, ti, cj).
When we refer to an input for TPG, we mean a true availability matrix A ∈ Nn×m where
each row Ai represents the true availability of a team ti for the m time slots. When we refer to a
strategy profile (in short, strategy) for input A we mean a declared availability matrix B ∈ Nn×m
where each row Bi represents the declared availability vector of team ti.
Computational Problems Related to the Game. Given a coalition, i.e., a subset of teams, a
deviation of the teams in the coalition from their current strategy profile is an improvement step
if, by this deviation, each team in the coalition strictly improves its pay-off. Given a positive
integer t, a t-strong Nash equilibrium for some input A is a strategy profile B such that no
coalition of at most t teams has an improvement step wrt. B. We are interested in the following
computational questions:
1. Given an input, a strategy profile, and a coalition of at most t teams, does this coalition
admit an improvement step compared to the given strategy profile?
2. Given an input, a strategy profile, and a positive integer t, is there any coalition of at most
t teams which has an improvement step compared to the given strategy profile?
3. Given an input and a positive integer t, does a t-strong Nash equilibrium for this input
exist?
We are particularly interested in understanding the dependency of the computational com-
plexity of the above problems on the number t of teams in a coalition. Specifically, we consider
(1) t being a constant (modeling situations where not too many teams are willing to cooperate
or where cooperation is costly) and (2) t being unbounded.
Illustrating Example. Consider the input matrix A given in Section 1, which specifies the true
availabilities of three teams t1, t2, t3 over two time slots c1, c2. If all teams declared their true
availabilities, then both time slots win with total availability 6. The pay-offs of the teams t1, t2, t3
are 1/3, 1/6, 1/3, respectively. Team t2 can improve its pay-off by declaring (0, 2) (i,e., declaring
0 for c1 and 2 for c2). As a result, c2 would become the unique winner with total availability 6
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and team t2 would receive a better pay-off: 1/3. Thus, the profile B for A where all teams declare
their true availabilities (i.e., where B = A) is not a 1-strong Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, A
does admit the following 1-strong Nash equilibrium:
B′ :=

2 21 2
3 0


The declared availability matrix B′, however, is not a 2-strong Nash equilibrium, since if
team t1 and t2 would form a coalition and declare the same availability vector (0, 2), then c2
would be the unique winner with total availability 4 and both t1 and t2 would have a better
pay-off: 1/2.
3 Improvement Steps
We begin with the following lemma, which basically says that, in search for an improvement
step, a fixed coalition of teams needs only to focus on a single time slot.
Lemma 1. If a coalition has an improvement step wrt. a strategy profile B, then it also has an
improvement step E = (eji ) wrt. B, where there is one time slot ck such that each team ti in the
coalition declares zero availability for all other time slots (i.e., eji = 0 holds for each team ti in
the coalition and each time slot cj 6= ck).
The missing proof for Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix A.1.
By Lemma 1, we know that if a fixed coalition has an improvement step for a strategy
profile B, then it admits an improvement step that involves only one time slot. Assume that
it is time slot ck. In order to compute an improvement step for the coalition, we first declare
zero availabilities for the teams in the coalition, for all other time slots. Then, we have to
declare specific availabilities for the teams in the coalition, for time slot ck. This is where the
collaboration between the teams comes into play: even though each team, in order to improve
its pay-off, might wish to declare as high as possible availability for time slot ck (i.e., its true
availability), the teams shall collaboratively decide on the declared availabilities, since a too-
high declared availability for one team might make it impossible for another team (even when
declaring the maximum possible amount, i.e., the true availability) to improve its pay-off. It
turns out that this problem is basically equivalent to the following problem (which, in our eyes,
is interesting also on its own).
Relation to Horn Constraint Systems. Using Lemma 1, we know that if a coalition of t
teams admits an improvement step for a strategy profile B, then it admits an improvement step
that involves only one time slot. Let ck be such a time slot. Then, finding an improvement step
that involves only time slot ck reduces to the following number problem. given a natural number
vector (a1, a2, . . . , at) ∈ N
t, a rational number vector (p1, p2, . . . , pt) ∈ Q
t with
∑
i∈[t] pi ≤ 1,
and a natural number p ∈ N, searches for a natural number vector (x1, x2, . . . , xt) where for
each i ∈ [t] the following holds: (1) 1 ≤ xi ≤ ai and (2) xi/(p+
∑
i∈[t] xi) > pi.
Intuitively, the vector (a1, . . . , at) corresponds to the true availabilities of the teams in the
coalition in time slot ck, while the solution vector (x1, . . . , xt) corresponds to the declared avail-
abilities of the teams in the coalition in time slot ck; accordingly, the first constraint makes
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sure that each declared availability is upper-bounded by its true availability. Further, the vector
(p1, . . . , pt) corresponds to the current pay-offs of the teams in the coalition, while p corresponds
to the sum of the declared availabilities of the teams not in the coalition at time slot ck; accord-
ingly, the second constraint makes sure that, for each team in the coalition, the new pay-off is
strictly higher than its current pay-off. More formally, we argue that the coalition {t1, t2, . . . , tt}
has an improvement step compared to strategy profile B, involving only time slot ck, if and only
if the instance (A∗, P, p) for t-Threshold Covering has a solution, where A∗ := (ak1 , . . . , a
k
t ),
P := (pay-off(B, t1), . . . , pay-off(B, tt)), and p :=
∑
i∈[n]\[t] b
k
i .
Remark 1. Since the values pi (i ∈ [t]) are rational numbers, we can rearrange the second
constraint in the description of t-Threshold Covering to obtain an integer linear feasibility
problem. This means that t-Threshold Covering is a special variant of the so-called Horn
Constraint System problem which, given a matrix U = (ui,j) ∈ R
n′×m′ with each row having
at most one positive element, a vector b ∈ Rn
′
, and a positive integer d, decides the existence of
an integer vector x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d}m
′
such that U ·x ≥ b; Horn Constraint System is weakly
NP-hard and can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time [8, 8].
Taking a closer look at t-Threshold Covering, we observe the following: if we would know
the sum of the variables (x1, . . . , xt), then we would be able to directly solve our problem by
checking every constraint and taking the smallest feasible value (i.e., given
∑
i∈[t] xi, we would
set each xi to be the minimum over all values satisfying xi/(p+
∑
i∈[t] xi) > pi). This yields a
simple polynomial-time algorithm for finding an improvement step for the likely case where all
availabilities are polynomially upper-bounded in the input size; technically, this means where
the input profile A is encoded in unary.
Theorem 1. Consider an input A and a strategy profile B. Let s be the sum of all entries in A.
Finding an improvement step (if it exists) for a given coalition is solvable in O(s2) time.
The proof for Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A.2.
Indeed, t-Threshold Covering can be reduced to finding the sum
∑
i∈[t] xi. If the input
is encoded in binary, however, then this sum might be exponentially large in the number of
bits that encode our input, thus we cannot simply enumerate all possible values. If the coalition
size t or a certain parameter ℓ that measures the number of “large” true availabilities is a
constant, then we still have polynomial-time algorithms for which the degree of the polynomial
in the running time does not depend on the specific parameter value. Specifically, by the famous
Lenstra’s theorem ([10], later improved by Kannan [7] and by Frank and Tardos [4]), we have
the following result.
Theorem 2. Consider an input A and a strategy profile B. Let L be the length of the binary
encoding of A. For each of the following times T , there is a T -time algorithm that finds an
improvement step, compared to B, for a given coalition of t teams:
1. T = O(t2.5t+o(t) · L2) and
2. for each constant value c, T = f(ℓc) · t
2 · Lc
2+2,
where f is a computable function and ℓc := maxj |{i ∈ [t] : a
j
i > L
c}| is the maximum over the
numbers of teams ti in the coalition that have true availabilities a
j
i with a
j
i > L
c for the same
time slot cj.
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The proof for Theorem 2 can be found in Appendix A.3.
Using Theorem 2, and checking all
∑t
i=1
(
n
i
)
possible coalitions of size at most t, we obtain
the following.
Corollary 1. Given an input and a strategy profile, we can find, in polynomial time, a coalition
of a constant number of teams and, for this coalition, find an improvement step compared to the
given profile.
In general, however, deciding whether an improvement step exists is computationally in-
tractable as the next result shows. We briefly note that, under standard complexity assumptions,
a problem being W[2]-hard for parameter k presumably excludes any algorithm with running
time f(k) · |I|O(1), where f is a computable function depending only on k and |I| is the size of
the input.
Theorem 3. Given an input and a strategy profile, deciding whether there is a coalition of size t
that has an improvement step is W[2]-hard wrt. t even if all teams are of size one. It remains
NP-complete if there is no restriction on the coalition size.
Proof. (Sketch). To show W[2]-hardness, we provide a parameterized reduction from the Set
Cover problem, which isW[2]-complete wrt. the set cover size k [3]: Given sets F = {S1, . . . , Sm}
over a universe U = {u1, . . . , un} of elements and a positive integer k, Set Cover asks whether
there is a size-k set cover F ′ ⊆ F , i.e., |F ′| = k and
⋃
Si∈F ′
Si = U . The idea of such a parame-
terized reduction is, given a Set Cover instance (F , U, k), to produce, in f(k) · (|F|+ |U |)O(1)
time, an equivalent instance (A,B, t) such that t ≤ g(k), where f and g are two computable
functions. Let (F , U, k) denote a Set Cover instance. For technical reasons, we assume that
each set cover contains at least three sets.
Time slots. For each element uj ∈ U , we create one element slot ej . Let E := {e1, . . . , en}
denote the set containing all element slots. We create two special time slots: α (the original
winner) and β (the potential new winner).
Teams and true availabilities A = (aji ). For each set Si ∈ F , we create a set team ti that
has true availability 1 at time slot α, at time slot β, and at each element slot ej with uj ∈ Si.
We introduce several dummy teams, as follows. Intuitively, the role of these dummy teams is
to allow to set specific sums of availabilities for the time slots; the crucial observation in this
respect is that the dummy teams do not have any incentive to change their true availabilities,
therefore we can assume that they do not participate in any coalition. For each element uj, let
#(uj) denote the number of sets from F that contain uj. For each element slot ej , we create
(2m − 1 − #(uj)) dummy teams such that each of these dummy teams has availability 1 at
element slot ej and availability 0 for all other time slots. Similarly, for time slot α, we create
m additional dummy teams, each of which has availability 1 for time slot α and availability 0
for all other time slots. For time slot β, we create 2m − 1 − k further dummy teams, each of
which has availability 1 for time slot β and availability 0 for all other time slots.
Declared availabilities B = (bji ). Each dummy team declares availability for the time slot
where it is available. Each set team declares availability for all time slots where it is available
except for time slot β where all set teams declare availability 0.
We set the size of the coalition t to be k. This completes the reduction which can be computed
in polynomial time. Indeed, it is also a parameterized reduction. A formal correctness proof as
well as the extension to the case of unrestricted coalition sizes to show the NP-hardness result
are deferred to Appendix A.4.
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Taking a closer look at the availability matrix constructed in the proof of Theorem 3, we
observe the following.
Corollary 2. Deciding the existence of an improvement step for any coalition is NP-hard, even
for very sparse availability matrices, i.e., even if each team has only one team member and is
truly available at no more than four time slots.
4 Nash equilibria
We move on to consider the existence of Nash equilibria. Somewhat surprisingly, it seems that,
a 1-strong Nash equilibrium always exists. Unfortunately, we can only prove this when the
maximum availability amax := maxi∈[n],j∈[m] a
j
i is at most three. Extending our proof strategy
to amax ≥ 4 seems to require a huge case analysis.
Theorem 4. If the maximum availability amax is at most three, then TPG always admits a
1-strong Nash equilibrium.
Proof. (Sketch). Let A = (aji ) be the input profile. We begin by characterizing two simple cases
for which 1-strong Nash equilibria always exist.
Safe single-team slot. Suppose that a time slot cj exists where only one team, ti, is available
with some availability a∗ (i.e., aji = a
∗), all other teams are not available in this time slot (i.e.,
aji′ = 0 for all i
′ 6= i), and no other team, ti′ , i
′ 6= i, is available with availability greater than a∗
at any time slot. Then, we obtain a 1-strong Nash equilibrium B = (bli) by setting b
j
i := a
j
i , and,
for each i′ ∈ [n] and each j′ 6= j, setting bj
′
i′
:= 0; to see why B is a Nash equilibrium, notice that
the only team (namely ti) i.e. available at time slot cj already receives the best possible pay-off
(namely 1) and no other team can prevent cj from being a co-winner, which would be necessary
to improve their pay-off (which is 0). We call such time slot cj a safe single-team slot.
Safe multiple-team slot. Suppose that a time slot cj exists where multiple teams have non-
zero true availabilities and no single team is powerful enough to prevent cj from co-winning, by
declaring zero availability. That is, for each team ti and each time slot cj′ 6= cj , it holds that
aj
′
i ≤
∑
i′ 6=i a
j
i′ . Again, we obtain a 1-strong Nash equilibrium B = (b
j
i ) by setting b
j
l
:= ajl for
each team tl and setting b
j′
l
:= 0 for each other time slot cj 6= cj′ . We call such time slot cj a
safe multiple-team slot. For example, the following input profile contains two safe multiple-team
slots, namely c1 and c4:
A :=
c1 c2 c3 c4



1 2 0 0 t1
2 0 2 0 t2
1 0 0 1 t3
0 1 1 3 t4
We are ready to consider instances amax ≤ 3.
Instances with amax = 2. Consider the maximum availability sum x of all time slots, i.e.,
the maximum column sum of the matrix A. Clearly, x ≥ amax. We proceed by considering the
different possible values of x.
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Cases with x = 2: If x is two, then there is a time slot where only one team is available with
availability amax = 2. Thus, there is a safe single-team slot.
Cases with x = 3: If x is three, then, since we have amax = 2, it follows that either (1) there is a
safe single-team slot where only one team is available with availability amax = 2 or (2) there is a
time slot cj where a single team ti has availability amax = 2 and another team ti′ has availability
1. In the first case, there is a safe single-team, so let us consider the second case. To this end,
let cj be the time slot such that a single team ti has availability amax = 2 and another team ti′
has availability 1. Next, we show how to construct a 1-strong Nash equilibrium B = (bji ). First,
for each team ti, set b
j
i := a
j
i and b
j′
i := 0, j
′ 6= j. This makes time slot cj the unique winner.
Team ti receives pay-off 2/3 and team ti′ receives pay-off 1/3. Second, for each time slot cj′ 6= cj ,
if aj
′
i′ > 0, then set b
j′
i′
:= 1; otherwise, find any team tk 6= ti with non-zero availability a
j′
k = 1
and set bj
′
k
:= 1. In this way, every time slot except cj has total availability one (if there is at
least one team with non-zero availability for this slot). Thus, cj remains a unique winner and
the declared total availabilities of other time slots make it impossible for any team to improve:
First, team ti cannot improve because it would receive the same pay-off 2/3 for every time slot
which it could make a new single winner (recall that no safe single-team slot exists). Second,
team ti′ also cannot improve because it cannot create a new single winner at all. Last, neither
of the remaining teams can improve because they cannot prevent cj from co-winning. Hence, we
have a 1-strong Nash equilibrium.
Cases with x ≥ 4: Every time slot cj with availability sum x is a safe multiple-team slot since
∀j′ : aj
′
i ≤ amax = 2 and ∀i :
∑
i′ 6=i a
j
i′ ≥ x− amax ≥ 2.
We defer the proof details for instances with amax = 3 to Appendix A.5.
Remark 2. We do not know any instances without 1-strong Nash equilibria. However, we could
not generalize our proof even for instances with amax = 4. Nevertheless, some general obser-
vations from our proof hold for every amax. In particular, if there is a column with only one
entry with amax (a special case of a safe single-team slot) or if the maximum column sum is at
least 2amax (a special case of a safe multiple-team slot), then a 1-strong Nash equilibrium exists.
Since our proof is constructive, we obtain the following.
Corollary 3. If the maximum availability amax is at most three, then a 1-strong Nash equilibrium
for TPG can be found in polynomial time.
The situation where t ≥ 2 is quite different already with only two teams. By a proof similar
to the case of t = 1 and amax = 2, we can show that a 2-strong Nash equilibrium always exists
for t = 2 and amax = 1:
Proposition 1. If the maximum availability amax is one, then a 2-strong Nash equilibrium for
TPG always exists and can be found in polynomial time.
Complementing Theorem 4, we demonstrate that 2-strong Nash equilibria do not always
exist, even when amax = 2; to this end, consider the following example.
Example 1. We provide in the following an example with maximum true availability two, and
show that it does not admit a 1-strong Nash equilibrium. Consider the following input for TPG.
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A :=
c1 c2( )2 0 t1
2 2 t2
0 2 t3
Informally, The main crux of this example is that t1 (or, symmetrically, t3) can cooperate
with t2; in such cooperation, t2 can choose whether to be ‘in favor‘ of t1 or t3, by declaring either
b21 = 2 and b
2
2 = 0 (favoring t1), or b
2
1 = 0 and b
2
2 = 2 (favoring t3). Moreover, t1 or t3 can
‘reward’ t2 by not declaring its true availability, which is 2, but only 1. In such a cooperation,
both t2 and t1 (or t2 and t3) strictly improve their pay-offs.
More formally, let us consider all possibilities for t2. By symmetry, we can assume without
loss of generality, that t2 declares either (0, 1), (0, 2), (1, 1), (1, 2), or (2, 2) (declaring (0, 0) is
not possible in a Nash equilibrium—see the analog (1, 1) case)).
To this end, we denote the declared availability matrix B simply by the symbolic vector
[b11b
2
1, b
1
2b
2
2, b
1
3b
2
3] (e.g. the declared availability matrix B = A is denoted by [20, 22, 02]). We write
B →X B′ if the coalition X receives a better pay-off by changing the declared availabilities from B
to B′.
Now, we consider each of the possible strategies that team t2 may take:
t2 declares (0, 1):
[x0, 01, 0y]→{t3} [x0, 01, 02] (0 ≤ x ≤ 2, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1); [x0, 01, 02]→{t2} [x0, 02, 02] (0 ≤ x ≤
2).
t2 declares (0, 2):
[x0, 02, 0y]→{t3} [x0, 02, 02] (0 ≤ x ≤ 2, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1);
[x0, 02, 02]→{t1,t2} [10, 20, 02] (0 ≤ x ≤ 2).
t2 declares (1, 1):
[x0, 11, 0y]→{t2} [x0, 20, 0y] (x > y);
[x0, 11, 0y]→{t2} [x0, 20, 0y] (x = y);
[x0, 11, 0y]→{t2} [x0, 02, 0y] (x < y).
t2 declares (1, 2):
[x0, 12, 0y]→{t3} [x0, 12, 02] (0 ≤ x ≤ 2, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1);
[x0, 12, 02]→{t2} [x0, 20, 02] (0 ≤ x ≤ 1);
[20, 12, 02]→{t1,t2} [10, 20, 02].
t2 declares (2, 2):
[x0, 22, 0y]→{t1} [20, 22, 0y] (0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1);
[20, 22, 02]→{t1,t2} [10, 20, 02];
[20, 22, 01]→{t2} [20, 02, 01];
[10, 22, 02]→{t2} [10, 20, 02].
The above case analysis cover (by symmetry) all possible cases, and thus, shows that there
are no 2-strong Nash equilibria for the instance A.
Naturally, there are profiles for which t-strong Nash equilibria do exist: consider, for example,
A being the all-one matrix.
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Next, we show that if the coalition size is unbounded, then finding a Nash equilibrium
becomes coNP-hard.
Theorem 5. Deciding whether a Nash equilibrium exists for a given input is coNP-hard.
Proof. (Sketch). We reduce from the complement of the following NP-complete problem [6]:
Restricted X3C, which given sets F = {S1, . . . , S3n}, each containing exactly 3 elements
from E = {e1, . . . , e3n} such that (1) n ≥ 2 and (2) each element ei appears in exactly 3 sets,
asks whether there is a size-n exact cover F ′ ⊆ F , i.e., |F ′| = n and
⋃
Si∈F ′
Si = U .
Given an instance (F , E) of the complement of Restricted X3C we construct a game.
For each element ei (i ∈ [3n]) we construct a time slot ei. We construct one additional time
slot, denoted by α. For each set Sj (j ∈ [3n]) we construct a team sj . For a team sj , we set
its availability for time slot ei, namely a
j
i , to be n if ei ∈ Sj , and otherwise 0. We set the
availability of all teams to be 1 in time slot α. We consider 2n-strong Nash-equilibria; thus, we
consider coalitions containing up to 2n teams. This finishes the description of the polynomial-
time reduction. The correctness proof can be found in Appendix A.6.
5 Conclusion
We introduced a game considering power of teams (referred to as TPG) that is naturally moti-
vated by online scheduling polls where teams declare and update their availabilities in a dynamic
process to increase their relative power. Our work leads to several directions for future research.
Tie-breaking rules: In this paper the teams are pessimistic, i.e., in case of several co-winners,
the pay-off is defined as the minimum of the relative number, over the co-winners. This corre-
sponds to situations where ties are broken adversarially. We chose this tie-breaking as a standard
and natural one, and as one which models teams which are pessimistic in nature, where having
too low power in the team might have very bad consequences. Naturally, one might study other
tie-breaking rules such as breaking ties uniformly at random or breaking ties lexicographically;
we mention that most of our results seem to transfer to lexicographic tie-breaking.
More refined availability constraints: In the online scheduling polls considered in this paper,
the availability constraints expressed by the participants are dichotomous: each participant can
only declare either “available” or “not available” at each time slot. Sometimes, the availability
constraints of people participating in scheduling polls are more fine-grained; for example, a
participant might not be sure whether she is available or not for some of the suggested time
slots, but can only provide a “maybe available” answer for these time slots. Correspondingly,
it is interesting to study TPG when we allow participants to express more refined availability
constraints, maybe even allowing them to fully rank the time slots according to their constraints.
Nash modification problem: Taking the point of view of the poll convener (who desires to
reach a Nash equilibrium), we suggest to study the following problem: given an input for TPG,
what is the minimum number of time slots that shall be removed so that the modified input will
have a Nash equilibrium?
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A Missing Proofs
Below we provide proofs missing from the main text.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose that, for a certain coalition, D = (dji ) is an improvement step for B = (b
j
i ). Let
cj1 and cj2 be two time slots such that at least one team ti in the coalition has d
j1
i 6= 0 and at
least one team ti′ (possibly different) in the coalition has d
j2
i′ 6= 0.
We distinguish between two cases. If cj1 /∈ winners(D) (or cj2 /∈ winners(D)), then the pay-
offs of all teams remain the same even if each team ti in the coalition with non-zero declared
availability dj1i (or d
j2
i ) for cj1 (or cj2) will declare zero instead. Otherwise, both cj1 and cj2
are co-winners in D. Fix any team ti in the coalition. Since strategy D is an improvement step
compared to B, it follows that the relative powers of ti in cj1 and in cj2 for strategy D are
both strictly larger than the pay-off of ti for strategy B. Thus, we can change the improvement
step D to make all teams in the coalition declare zero availability, say, in cj2 , and we would still
obtain an improvement step. By repeating the above reasoning, we fix a desired improvement
step where all teams in the coalition have non-zero availability only in the same single time
slot.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Following Lemma 1, we begin by guessing the unique time slot ck for which the teams in
the coalition will declare non-zero availability.
Further, we guess the value of w :=
∑t
i=1 xi. Crucially, this value is upper-bounded by∑t
i=1 a
j
i ≤ sn; recall that s is the sum of all true availabilities and n is the number of teams. Then,
for each team ti in the coalition, we compute the minimum value needed for ti to get strictly bet-
ter pay-off than pay-off(B, ti), i.e.,
min{x ≤ aji | x/(p + w) > pay-off(B, ti)}, where p is the sum of the declared availabilities
of the teams not in the coalition; we pick these values as the xi’s. If as a result we obtain∑t
i=1 xi ≤ w, then we return (x1, . . . , xt). Otherwise, we proceed to the next guess. If all guesses
fail, then we reject. The running time is O(s2).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Following Lemma 1, we begin by guessing the unique time slot ck for which the teams in
the coalition will declare non-zero availability.
After guessing the unique time slot ck for which the teams in the coalition would declare
non-zero availabilities, we can run the integer linear program (ILP, in short) specified for the
t-Threshold Covering problem. By the famous result of Lenstra [10] (later improved by Kan-
nan [7] and by Frank and Tardos [4]), we know that an ILP with ρ variables and z input bits can
be solved in O(ρ2.5ρ+o(ρ) · z) time. Since the ILP specified for t-Threshold Covering has t
variables and can be represented in O(|A′| · |B′|) bits, where |A′| and |B′| denote the numbers of
binary bits needed to encode the true and the declared availabilities at time slot cj , respectively,
we obtain an algorithm with running time O(t2.5t+o(t) · L2).
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As for the second running time, after guessing the unique time slot ck, we additionally guess
the sum w′ of declared availabilities of the teams in the coalition whose true availabilities are
upper-bounded by Lc; we call these teams small teams. Then, we modify the ILP specified for
t-Threshold Covering to search for the declared availabilities of the remaining teams. Using
the declared availabilities for the remaining teams, we can calculate the declared availabilities
for the small teams as described in the first algorithm. Again, by Lenstra’s result, we can solve
the ILP in g(ℓc) · |A
′
j | · |B
′
j | time, where |A
′
j | and |B
′
j | denote the numbers of binary bits needed
to encode the true and declared availabilities at time slot ck, respectively. Searching for the
declared availabilities for the small teams can be done in O(t2 ·Lc
2
) time. In total, we obtain an
algorithm with running time f ′(ℓc) · t
2 · Lc
2+2.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
(correctness, unrestricted coalition size)
Proof. Let us state the total availabilities of the various time slots. Each element slot has total
availability 2m − 1, time slot β has total availability 2m − 1 − k, and time slot α has total
availability 2m. Indeed, time slot α is a unique winner. Each set team receives a pay-off of 1/(2m)
and each dummy team receives pay-off zero.
Next, we prove the correctness of the reduction. For the “if” case, assume that there is a size-
k set cover F ′ ⊆ F . We show that the coalition that corresponds to the set cover F ′ (recall that
t = k) can improve by making time slot β the unique winner. To this end, each set team ti with
Si ∈ F
′ changes its declared availability for time slot α and for all element slots to 0 and changes
its declared availability for time slot β to 1. As a result, time slot α has total availability 2m−k,
each element slot has total availability at most 2m− 2 (since the coalition corresponds to a set
cover), and time slot β has total availability 2m− 1. Thus, time slot β is the unique winner and
each set team receives a pay-off of 1/(2m− 1); this is a strict improvement for all teams in the
coalition.
For the “only if” case, assume that there is a coalition of t teams that can improve their
pay-offs by changing their declared availabilities. We observe that time slot α cannot be a (co-
)winner since if it was, then either no team would improve or the pay-off of at least one coalition
member would be zero. Now, we show that the subfamily F ′ corresponds to the coalition is a
set cover of size t = k. For this, we distinguish between two cases, depending on whether time
slot β is a unique winner or not.
First, suppose that the coalition makes time slot β become the new unique winner. Then, after
changing the coalition’s declared availabilities, time slot β has total availability of at most 2m−1.
It follows that each element time slot has total availability of at most 2m− 2. This implies that
F ′, which corresponds to the set teams of the coalition, forms a set cover, since otherwise there
would be one element slot for which the coalition cannot decrease its total availability to be at
most 2m− 2.
Next, suppose that β is not a unique winner which means that there is some subset E′ ⊆ E
of element slots within the co-winner set (including the case that some element slot ej is a
unique winner). Note that if the coalition contains only one team t∗, then time slot α would still
be a (co-)winner which is not possible by the arguments above. Thus, let us assume that the
coalition has at least two teams that make all element slots from E′ become (co-)winners. All
coalition members must still declare availability 1 for all element slots from E′, since otherwise
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the pay-off of some coalition members would decrease to zero. Furthermore, for each element
slot ej /∈ E
′ that is not a co-winner, there is at least one coalition member that changes its
declared availability from 1 to 0, since otherwise ej would be a co-winner. Hence, subfamily F
′
is a set cover (recall that it corresponds to the teams in the coalition): each element corresponding
to an element slot from E′ is covered by all sets from F ′ and each element corresponding to an
element slot from E \ E′ is covered by at least one set from F ′.
By the analysis of the two cases above, the existence of a coalition that can improve always
implies the existence of a set cover. This completes the proof for the case that the size of the
coalition is at most t.
Unrestricted coalition size. Our problem is in NP as we can check in polynomial-time
whether a specific strategy is an improvement step for a given coalition. If there is no restriction
on the coalition size, then NP-hardness does not immediately transfer from the above construc-
tion, but it can be obtained by a slight modification as follows.
The above proof would almost work through: a size-k set cover in the original instance still
implies a coalition of size t that can improve by making β be the new unique winner. Furthermore,
by the same arguments as above, it still follows that every coalition that can improve still consists
of set teams which correspond to a set cover. We cannot, however, exclude the existence of a
coalition which corresponds to a set cover of size larger than t. To fix this, we assume that each
element in our Set Cover instance occurs in at most three sets. (This variant remains NP-hard
since Vertex Cover remains NP-hard even if each vertex has degree at most three [5]; we did
not assume this in the W[2]-hardness proof since this variant is not W[2]-hard.) We further
assume, without loss of generality, that k ≥ 3.
The reasoning for the restricted coalition size case still holds, so it only remains to show that
no coalition of size larger than t can improve. Assume, towards a contradiction, that there is
a coalition of size at least t + 1 that can improve. First, notice again that time slot α cannot
be a (co-)winner. Second, assume that there is some subset E′ ⊆ E of element slots within the
set of co-winners (including the case that some element slot ej is a single winner). All coalition
members must still declare availability 1 for all element slots from E′, since otherwise the pay-off
of some team member would decrease to zero. However, this is not possible since each element
occurs in at most three sets and t+1 = k+1 > 3. Third, assume that the coalition makes time
slot β be the new unique winner. Then, after changing the coalition’s declared availabilities,
time slot β has total availability of at least 2m since otherwise some coalition members would
decrease their pay-off. However, this also means that no coalition member improves its pay-off,
which is at most the same as the original pay-off 1/(2m). This completes the proof for the case
of unrestricted coalition size.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4 (instances with amax 6= 2)
Proof. Instances with amax = 1. Considering the above two cases, the proof is relatively simple
for inputs with amax = 1: either there is a column j in A where only one team has availability 1,
implying that time slot cj is a safe single-team slot, or every time slot cj is a safe multiple-team
slot since ∀j′ : aj
′
i ≤ amax = 1 and ∀i :
∑
i′ 6=i a
j
i′ ≥ 1.
Instances with amax = 3. We consider the case where the maximum true availability amax is
three. Again, let x be the maximum sum of availabilities over all time slots, and notice that
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x ≥ amax. If x is at least six, then every time slot cj with availability sum x is a safe multiple-
team slot, because ∀j′ : aj
′
i ≤ amax = 3 and ∀i :
∑
i′ 6=i a
j
i′ ≥ x − amax ≥ 3. If x is three, then
there is a time slot where only one team is available with availability amax = 3, i.e., there is a
safe single-team slot.
Now, assume that x is four or five. We distinguish between four cases and implicitly assume
that the kth case does not hold in the (k+1)th case. First, there is a safe single-team slot (which
implies a 1-strong Nash equilibrium by our observation). Note that this case includes time slots
where only one team is available with availability amax = 3 as well as the situation that there
is a time slot cj where only one team ti is available with availability 2 and ti is the only team
with availability 2 for every time slot.
Second, there is a time slot cj where one team ti has availability amax = 3 and another
team ti′ has availability one while every remaining team has availability zero. Analogously to
the case with amax = 2 and x = 3, first, for each team tℓ, we set b
j
ℓ
:= ajℓ and b
j′
ℓ
:= 0 (j′ 6= j to
make time slot cj a single winner. Team ti receives pay-off 3/4 and team ti′ receives pay-off 1/4.
Now, for each team tℓ and for each time slot cj′ 6= cj, we modify the declared availabilities b
j′
ℓ
as follows. If there is some ℓ /∈ {i, i′} with aj
′
ℓ = 3, then set b
j′
ℓ
:= aj
′
ℓ . Otherwise, if a
j′
i′ > 0,
then set bj
′
i′
:= aj
′
i′ and if a
j′
i′ = 0, then set b
j′
ℓ
:= aj
′
ℓ for the first position ℓ /∈ {i, i
′} with aj
′
ℓ > 0.
This does not prevent cj from being the unique winner but makes it impossible for the teams
to improve their pay-offs: team ti cannot improve, because it would receive at most the same
pay-off 3/4 for every time slot which it could make a new single winner. Note that, since we
are not in the first case, it follows that there is no time slot where only team ti is available
with availability amax = 3. Furthermore, if there is a time slot cj∗ where team ti is available
with availability 2 and no other team is available, then there is some time slot cj′′ with a
j′′
i′′ = 3
(i′′ 6= i) and, hence, bj
′′
i′′ = 3. (This slot cj′′ must exist since otherwise we would be in the first
case and have a safe single-team slot cj∗ .) Thus, team ti cannot make cj∗ become a new single
winner. Team ti′ also cannot improve, because it cannot create a new single winner at all. Hence,
we have a 1-strong Nash equilibrium.
Third, there is a time slot cj where one team ti has availability amax = 3 and another team ti′
has availability two, implying that the remaining teams are not available at slot cj . Similarly
to the previous case, for each team tℓ, we first set b
j
ℓ
:= ajℓ and b
j′
ℓ
:= 0 (j′ 6= j) to make time
slot cj a single winner. Team ti receives pay-off 3/5 and team ti′ receives pay-off 2/5. Now, for
each team tℓ 6= ti and for each time slot cj′ 6= cj with a
j′
i = amax = 3, we modify its declared
availability bj
′
ℓ such that the total declared availability sum of the teams other than ti is always
two at time slot cj′ .
• If aj
′
i′ ≥ 2, then set b
j′
i′
:= aj
′
i′ .
• If aj
′
i′ = 1, then set b
j′
i′
:= aj
′
i′ and let tℓ /∈ {ti, ti′} be the first team with 0 < a
j′
ℓ < amax
and set bj
′
ℓ
:= aj
′
ℓ . Note that such a team tℓ must exist since we are not in the second case.
• If aj
′
i′ = 0, then set b
j′
ℓ
:= aj
′
ℓ for the first team tℓ /∈ {ti, ti′} with a
j′
ℓ > 1 or for the first two
teams tℓ /∈ {ti, t
′
i} with a
j′
ℓ = 1. Again, such teams tℓ exist(s) since we are not in the second
case. This does not prevent cj from being the unique winner but makes it impossible for
the teams to improve their pay-offs: team ti cannot improve, because it would receive at
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most the same pay-off 3/5 for every time slot which it could make a new (co-)winner. Each
of the remaining teams (including ti′) also cannot improve, because it cannot create a new
single winner at all (note that x = 5).
Hence, we have a 1-strong Nash equilibrium.
Fourth, there is a time slot cj where one team ti has availability amax = 3 and there are
another two teams, ti′ and ti′′ , both with availability one. Similarly to the previous case, for
each team tℓ, we first set b
j
ℓ
:= ajℓ and b
j′
ℓ
:= 0 (j′ 6= j) to make time slot cj a single winner.
Team ti receives pay-off 3/5 and teams ti′ and ti′′ both receive pay-off 1/5. Then, for each time
slot cj′ 6= cj such that a
j′
i = amax = 3, we modify the declared availabilities b
j′
ℓ of some teams ℓ:
• If aj
′
i′ > 0 and a
j′
i′′ > 0, then set b
j′
i′
:= 1 and set bj
′
i′′
:= 1.
• If aj
′
i′ = 0 and a
j′
i′′ > 1, then set b
j′
i′′
:= aj
′
i′′ .
• If aj
′
i′ = 0 and a
j′
i′′ = 1, then set b
j′
i′′
:= aj
′
i′′ , let tℓ be the first team with 0 < a
j′
ℓ < amax,
and set bj
′
ℓ
:= aj
′
ℓ . Note that such a team tℓ must exist since we are not in the second case.
• If aj
′
i′ = 0 and a
j′
i′′ = 0, then let tℓ, tℓ′ be the first two teams with a
j′
ℓ = a
j′
ℓ′ = 1 and
set bj
′
ℓ
:= aj
′
ℓ . Note that such a team tℓ must exist since we are not in the first three cases.
The cases with aj
′
i′′ = 0 follow analogously. The new declared availabilities still make cj
a unique winner but make it impossible for the teams to improve their pay-offs: team ti
cannot improve, because it would receive at most the same pay-off 3/5 for every time slot
which it could make a new (co-)winner. Neither of the remaining teams (including ti′ and
team ti′′) can improve, because they cannot create a new single winner at all.
Hence, we have a 1-strong Nash equilibrium.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 5 (correctness)
We will use the following observation.
Observation 1. Let B be a Nash-equilibrium for some input A. Then, for each time slot cj ∈
winners(B), all teams declare their true availabilities.
Proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that the declared availability of some team ti in time
slot cj is strictly less than its true availability. Then, this team can improve its payoff by declaring
its true availability.
Now we are ready to proof the correctness of the construction for Theorem 5.
Proof. (of Theorem 5). Now, we show that a 2n-Nash-equilibrium exists if and only if an exact
cover does not exist.
We show the “only if” part by showing that existence of an exact cover implies non-existence
of a Nash-equilibrium. To this end, we assume that there is an exact cover and prove that a
Nash-equilibrium does not exist.
18
Let F ′ be an exact cover. Consider the remaining sets F¯ ′ = {S1, . . . , S3n} \ F
′. It holds that
|F ′| = n and |F¯ ′| = 2n. Notice further that, while F ′ covers each element exactly once, F¯ ′ covers
each element exactly twice.
We further assume, towards a contraction, that a Nash-equilibrium does exist; let us denote
it by B. In what follows, we consider several cases concerning the structure of profile B, which
is a Nash-equilibrium, and show an improvement step for each of these cases, contradicting the
assumption that B is indeed a Nash-equilibrium.
Consider the set of winning time slots of B. First we consider the case where α ∈ B.
Case 1. In this case, α ∈ winners(B). By Observation 1 we have that the declared availabilities
of all teams in α is 1; thus, the sum of declared availabilities for all winning slots is 3n. Below,
we consider three different sub-cases.
Case 1a. In this case, α is the only winning time slot, i.e., α = winners(B). Consider any time
slot, say e1, and consider the three teams who are available in it, say si, sj , and sk. We claim
that these teams can improve their pay-off, as follows: if si, sj , and sk, will declare availability
of 0 for all time slots except for e1 for which they will declare availability of n, then their pay-off
would increase from 13n to
1
3 .
Case 1b. In this case, there are at most three other time-slots, besides α, with sum of declared
availabilities being 3n, and there exists a team si such that a
i
j = n for each j such that Ej ∈
winners(B). We claim that si can improve its pay-off, as follows: if si will declare availability of
0 for time slot α, then its pay-off would increase from 13n to
1
3 .
Case 1c. In this case, α is indeed a winning slot, but neither Case 1a nor Case 1b hold. It
follows that, for every team sj there must exist Ei ∈ winners(B) such that a
j
i = 0. Thus,
pay-off(sj , B) = 0 for each team sj . Recall that F¯ ′ contains those sets which are not part of the
exact cover for the instance of Restricted X3C. We claim that the set of teams corresponding
to the sets in F¯ ′ can improve their pay-off as follows: if each such team will declare availability
of 0 for all time slots Ei and availability of 1 for α, then their pay-offs would increase to
1
3n .
This follows since F¯ ′ covers each element twice, thus, by deviating as described above, the sum
of declared availabilities of all time slots Ei would decrease to being at most n, while the sum
of availabilities of α would be at least 2n, making α a unique winner.
Next we consider the case where α is not winning.
Case 2. In this case, α /∈ winners(B). By Observation 1 we have that the declared availabilities
in the winning time slots of all teams is n, thus, the sum of declared availabilities for all winning
time slots is 3n. Below, we consider two sub-cases.
Case 2a. In this case, there exists a team si such that a
i
j = n for each j such that Ej ∈
winners(B). Since in the instance of Restricted X3C we have that no two sets are the same,
it follows that there are four other teams, besides si, denoted by sj, sf , sp, and sq, and two
different time slots, denoted by ex and by ey, such that it the following conditions hold:
1. aix = a
j
x = a
f
x = n;
2. aiy = a
p
y = a
q
y = n;
3. j /∈ {p, q};
4. Ey ∈ winners(B).
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Notice that pay-off(sj , B) = 0, pay-off(si, B) =
1
3 , and pay-off(sf , B) ≤
1
3 . We claim that
si, sj , sf can improve their pay-offs as follows: if si, sf will declare availabilities of n for time slot
Ex and 0 for all other slots while sj will declare availability of n− 1 for time slot Ex and 0 for
all other slots, then Ex would become the unique winning time slot; as a result, the pay-offs of
si, sf would increase to
n
3n−1 while the pay-off of sj would increase to
n−1
3n−1 .
Case 2b. In this case, no team exists i.e. available in all winning time slots. In this case, the
improvement step described in Case 1c is an improvement step, and the reasoning is the same,
thus omitted.
For the “if” part, we have to that if no exact cover exists, then there is a Nash equilibrium. To
this end, we will describe a profile B and would argue that, if indeed an exact cover does not
exist, then B is a Nash-equilibrium.
The profile B is as follows. Each team sj declares availability of n for all time slots ei and
availability of 0 for α, making each time slot a co-winner. Thus, the pay-off of each team is
0. Let us assume, towards a contradiction, that B is not a 2n-Nash-equilibrium, i.e., that an
improvement step with respect to B, involving at most 2n teams, exists, denoted by B′.
First of all, we observe that no time slot ei is a winning time slot (i.e., ei /∈ winners(B
′) for
all ei) because otherwise after the improvement step B
′, at least 3n− 3 teams will have pay-off
0 (this follows since, in the instance of Restricted X3C, each element is included in exactly
three sets). However, no coalition of at most 3 teams can decrease the sum of availabilities of all
other time slots as to make ei the unique winner; thus, we conclude that, after the improvement
step, α shall be the unique winning slot.
The maximum sum of availabilities which time slot α might get after an improvement step
involving at most 2n teams is 2n. Therefore, to have that such a deviation is a profitable
deviation, i.e., an improvement step, the sum of declared availabilities of all time slots ei has to
decrease by at least n + 1. This could happen only if, for each time slot ei, at least two teams
with non-zero availabilities would decrease their declared availabilities. Thus, an exact cover
must exist.
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